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In the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah
METALS MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
' 10116

BANK OF COMMERCE, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

The defendant and respondent resp·ectfully petitions
the Court for rehearing upon the following grounds and
for the following reasons:
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The Court erred in that it confused the question of
the application of the private contracts statute with a question of the contractual rights of the parties involved under
a lease agreement. In so doing, it failed to apply controlling decisions set down by the Utah Supreme Court for
determining whether the railings were annexed to the land
in such a way as to come within the private contracts
statute.
POINT II
The Court's opinion is based upon facts which are
not contained in the record of the Trial Court and which,
in fact, are contrary to the facts contained in such record.
POINT III
The Court, in its decision, erred in that contrary to
controlling Utah law, it construed the facts in this case
in a light favorable to those who the statute is intended to protect rather than in a light most favorable
to the defendant who had prevailed below.
POINT IV
The Court, in its decision, erred in that it failed to
apply controlling statutes and principles of law which are
inconsistent with a broad application of the statute in
questton.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays that the judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mcnt and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument be permitted of the entire case.

A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This brief is submitted to the Supreme Court in support of a Petition for Rehearing upon the decision of this
Court filed October 23, 1964, reversing a judgment of the
third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County holding
that certain aluminum railings were not in the nature of
an improvement to a structure on land and were, therefore, personal property not subject to the Utah Private
Contracts statute, Section 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of the Utah
Code Annotated. This rehearing is urged upon the Court
because of the far reaching effect of the unprecedented
and unjust legal theory announced in the Court's decision.
Because of the Court's erronious assumption that the
facts of this case are undisputed, the facts, as established
by the record in the Trial Court, are set forth below.
In the spring of 1963, respondent leased a bank building in Magna, Utah, for the purpose of conducting a commercial banking business. Under the terms of the lease,
the building was to be remodeled by the lessor to meet
certain requirements of the lessee. The lease anticipated
that all furnishings contained in the bank building would
be furnished by the lessee. Prior to opening its banking
business, respondent contracted with Arnold Drews of
Modern Ornamental Iron Works for certain aluminum
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railings and gates. Drews submitted a bid for this work
of $1,457.10 which was accepted by respondent (Dep.
p. 7). Drews r~quested an advance payment on the railings representing that a lower price could be obtained if he
had the cash to pay for the materials at the time they were
ordered. Respondent, through its agent, C. I. Canfield,
advanced $1,200 upon the representation of Drews that
the materiaJs were to be furnished by a Los Angeles Company (Dep. p. 4). Drews, without responde,t's knowledge or consent (Dep. p. 4) contracted with the appellant
for the construction of these railings and agreed to pay
appellant $1,748.00 for the railings. He represented to
the appellant that the railings were constructed for the
Idaho State Bank. Drews picked up the railings from appellant and installed them in respondent's bank. Respondent then paid him for the .railings. Drews failed to
pay appellant for the railings and some two months later,
when appellant discovered that the railings were, in fact,
in respondent's bank, it made demand on respondent for
payment. Since respondent had already made payment
for the railings, it refused to pay the second time, whereupon appellant commenced action, under the Utah Private Contracts Act, Section 14-2-2 of the Utah Code
Annotated, to recover the reasonable value of its materials.
Respondent defended this action before the Trial Court
sitting without a jury, and after having considered the
evidence presented by both sides, the Trial Court found
that respondent had no intent to permanently affix the
railings to the realty and therefore under Utah law the
railings were personal property and not subject to the
Utah Private Contracts Act.
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POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN THAT IT CONFUSED
THE QUESTION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
PRIVATE CONTRACTS STATUTE WITH A QUESTION OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS O·F THE
PARTIES INVOLVED UNDER A LEASE AGREEMENT. IN DOING SO IT FAILED TO APPLY CONTROLLING DECISIONS SET DOWN BY THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE RAILINGS IN QUESTIO·N WERE ANNEXED TO THE LAND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
COME WITHIN THE PRIVATE CONTRACTS STATUTE.
The question of the rights of third parties under the
lease was not before the Supreme Court in this case since
it was not considered by the Trial Court nor was it in any
way raised by the pleadings. This case does not turn on
the subjective intent of the parties to the lease agreement. The Supreme Court seems to have the mistaken
impression that respondent in relying for relief on its
contractual rights under the lease agreement. This is not
the case. The respondent relies on objective evidence as
to whether the property in question was real property
subject to the Private Contracts Act or personal property
not subject to the Act. This evidence was presented to
the Trial Court and in respondents' brief on appeal so as
to meet the test set forth by the Utah Court in the case
of King Bros., Inc., v. Utah Dry Kiln Company 13 U 2d
339, 342, 374 p 2d 154 (1962).
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The question that is before the Supreme Court in this
case is application of the private contracts statute to items
of property about which there is some uncertainty as to
whether they are real property or personal property. In
such cases, the Utah Supreme Court has held that uin
order to qualify under the Private Contracts Statute, it
is necessary that there be an annexation to the land, or to
some permanent structure upon it, so that the materials
in question can properly be regarded as having become a
part of the realty, or a fixture appurtenant to it, and
this must have been done with an intention of making it
a permanent part thereof." King Bros., Inc., supra.
The test of intention is further explained by the case
cited by the Supreme Court as authority for the rule in
the King case supra. That test is set forth as follows:
uThe intent is not to be gathered from testimony of the actual state of the mind of the party
making the annexation ~· :z. :z. but is to be inferred,
when not determined by an express agreement,
from the nature of the article affixed, the relation
and situation to the freehold of the party making
the annexation, the manner of the annexation, and
the purpose for which it is made." Westinghouse
Electric SupplJI Company, v. Hawthorn, 150 P. 2d
55' 57 ( 1944) .
The Trial Court carefully applied these rules to the
evidence submitted in the present case and determined as
a matter of fact that respondent had no intention to permanently affix the railings in question to the building.
Having reached this factual conclusion, the lower court
applied the rule of the Kin.g case supra to hold that the
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Private Contracts statute has no application to the present
case. The Supreme Court by overturning that decision
has placed itself in the position of the trier of fact. In
acting as the trier of fact, it has overlooked the rule previously set down by it in the King Bros. case supra.
POINT II
THE COURT'S OPINION IS BASED UPON
FACTS WHICH ARE NO·T CONTAINED IN THE
RECORD OF THE TRIAL COURT AND WHICH,
IN FACT, ARE CONTRARY TO THE FACTS CONTAINED IN SUCH RECORD.
1. In paragraph three of its opinion, the Court states
that the respondent bank u • • • contracted with one Drews
to obtain and place on the premises certain aluminurr.
railings and gates, according to specifications demanded
by the bank. With the bank's knowledge Drews obtained
the railings and gates from plaintiff ... " [emphasis supplied].

The record contains no support for the Court's factual finding that the respondent had knowledge that the
railings and gates were purchased from the plaintiff. The
record (Dep. p. 4) contains the following:
MR. CANFIELD: u • • • he told me at the time
he didn't have sufficient aluminum on hand to
complete the job and would have to order it out
of Los Angeles.

ul asked him how long it would take and he
informed me two or three days.
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ushortly after that, he called at the bank and
said that the aluminum railing was coming in ...
and he didn't have quite enough money to pay for
them but he could get a discount by paying for
them at the time and asked me if I would advance
him a little money to help pick up the costs on this
material and if I would do so he would decrease
his bid by 10 percent."
and in another place, contains the following (Dep. p. 6) :
uMR. CANFIELD: u... He asked me if we
did buy the fixtures from Drews. I told him yes.
uHe said, have you paid for them?

uHe said, we made these.
ul said, I have no knowledge of it."
The record of the Trial Court clearly shows that
respondent bank had no knowledge of the source from
which Drews obtained the railings except the representation of Drews that they came from Los Angeles.
2. Respondents presented substantial evidence to the
Trial Court to support a factual conclusion that the respondents did not install the railings in question with an
intention of making them a permanent part of the realty.
In its statement of the pertinent facts of this case, the
Supreme Court makes no mention of the facts and circumstances presented by respondents to the Trial Court
to show the lack of any intention to permanently annex
the railings to the real estate. If the facts of this case were
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undisputed as the Supreme Court concludes there would
be no question as to what the intention of the respondent
was. Respondent contends that it had no intention of
making the r(l.ilings in question a permanent part of the
realty. It supports this fact by evidence as to the nature
of the railings which shows that they were designed to be
and were in fact easily portable (Defendants Exhibit D-5,
Testimony of Respondents' Vice President, Rec. 11, 12,
13, 14) that they were constructed and attached in such
a way that they could be moved from place to place or
moved entirely (Rec. 9). These plans for the use of the
railings were communicated to the lessor of respondents'
building and among respondents' officers (Rec. 17, 18,
19, Dep. p. 10, lines 8-10) with regard to the design of
the railings, Mr. C. R. Canfield, Vice President of respondent, stated at pages 12, 13, 16 and 17 of the record.
uQ. well, just the general theory of the plan
that was used for the bank. Was there any one
central idea that prevailed in planning the bank?
uA. Well, he set up· the plan of the bank, the
inside of the bank, so that it can be adjusted and
moved as situations require it in our operation.
uQ. Thank you. At the time you planned
the bank building, did you contemplate the possibility that you might have to move to a different
building?
u.A. Well, we discussed it; there is always
that possibility.
·
u.Q. And if you did move to another building did you contemplate the necessity of moving
the interior facilities of the bank?
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uA. He set it up so that all of the equipment
we have got belongs to the company, so that we can
move it if we want to."
Evidence that respondents were lessees supports a factual conclusion that they had no intention to permanently
affix the railings to the realty and thereby enrich the
freehold. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Hawthorn

Supra.
Testimony of a witness engaged in the production of
such railings indicates that they were frequently moved
from place to place by banking institutions and are treated
much the same as furniture (R. 31, line 1-7, 16-24). The
lease was introduced in the Trial Court not to show that
appellant "\\ras legally bound by its provisions but rather as
evidence of the intent of the party annexing the property
not to permanently annex the property to the realty.
Respondents intention not to permanently annex the
railings is shown by evidence that the railings were designed so as to be removable without material injury to the
premises and that a supply of matching rubber tile was
maintained by respondent to cover the screwholes in the
floor in the event the railings were removed, ( Rec. 19,
line 2 3-3 0 ; 2 0 line 1-6) . Evidence as to the purpose for
which the annexation was made further supports a factual
conclusion of lack of intent to permanently affix to the
realty. The record contains evidence that the railings are
used to direct traffic in the bank and to decorate the bank's
interior-all of such evidence supports the factual conclusion reached by the Trial Court.
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The Supreme Court, in its opinion has failed to even
mention any of this evidence and has concluded that the
facts arc undisputed, yet in the recent case of King Bros.,
Inc., supra, the court, considering the application of the
exact same statute that is involved in this case, stated:
uOrdinarily there is not much difficulty in
telling when materials become a part of the realty,
but in the fringe areas where uncertainties exist,
their status frequently depends on the particular
circumstances. The facts must be ascertained so
that under the guidance of applicable principles of
law the correct determination can be made."
It would seem that the principal fact in this case,
namely, what the intention of the annexing party was, is
very much in dispute. In determining the outcome of this
dispute, the Trial Court reached the factual conclusion
that no intent to permanently affix existed.
POINT III
THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ERRED IN
THAT CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING UTAH
LA\\r IT CONSTRUED THE FACTS IN THIS CASE
IN A LIGHT FAVORABLE TO THOSE TO WHOM
THE STATUTE IS INTENDED TO PROTECT
RATHER THAN IN A LIGHT MOST FAVO·RABLE
TO THE DEFENDANT WHO HAD PREYAILED BELOW.
According to its opinion, the Court has construed
the facts in this case uwith an eye focused on the wordSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ing purpose and intent of the statute involved, and in a
light favorable to those to whom it intends to protect."
To put itself in a position to apply this rule, the Court concluded that the facts of the case were not in dispute. In
light of the quotations and references set forth in II
above, which show that there is substantial dispute in the
factual question of intent and on the question of the respondents knowledge of Drews' purchase of the railings
from appellant, it is clear that this rule would not apply.
In cases where the lower court has made a factual determination, the Utah law is as follows:
uThe question ... being generally one of fact
as to what was the intention of the parties, is to
be determined from all attendant circumstances
... the Defendant having prevailed, is entitled to
have the Supreme Court view the evidence and
every fair inference and intendment arising therefrom in the light most favorable to it, and if when
so regarded, there is any substantial evidence, or,
as sometimes stated, any reasonable basis in the evidence, to support the finding made by the Trial
Court, it will not be disturbed." John C. Cutler
Assn, v. D. Jay Stores, 3 U 2d 107, 279 P 2d 700
(1955).
If this rule is applied, the Supreme Court would be
required to uphold the lower court's conclusion that respondents had no intent to permanently affix the railings
to the realty, therefore, the railings involved were personal property not subject to the Utah Private Contracts
Act.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

POINT IV

THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ERRED IN
THAT IT FAILED TO APPLY CONTROLLING STATUTES AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW WHICH ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH A BROAD APPLICATION
OF THE STATUTE IN QUESTION.
The first full paragraph on page 2 of the court's
opinion implies that Section 14-2-1 of the Utah Code
would apply even though there was no annexation of the
railings in question to the land or structures upon it so
as to make the railings a part of the realty. The Court
apparently held that any person who has furnished material or performed labor for or upon any such building,
structure or improvement, payment for which has not
been made, shall have a direct right of action against the
surities upon such bond for the value of the materials or
labor.
Such a ruling seems clearly contrary to the statute
which provides for application only to contracts ccfor
the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of,
any building, structure or improvement upon land. . . ."
It also is contrary to the rule in the King Bros. case, supra
and entirely inconsistent with the rule in Backus v. Hooten
4 U 2d 364, 294 P 2d 703 (1956) favoring strict construction of a statute imposing double liability.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Supreme Court
should reconsider this case in light of the cases and facts
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referred to herein in order to avoid an unjust or unnecessary broadening of this statute that would be contrary to
the intention of the legislature and inconsistent with established legal precedents in the State of Utah. A reconsideration would also give the Court an opportunity to
avoid the unjust result reached here on the basis of facts
not contained in the record of the Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
John A. Dahlstrom and
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
300 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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